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Abstract.  The small war between Georgia and Russia 
from 8 to 22 August 2008 has shattered any remaining 
illusions over the frontiers of the normative map of 
Europe. All the primary parties have to be criticised: 
Russia for setting a trap for Saakashvili to fall into, the 
Georgian leadership for its astounding military and 
political blunder in falling into it, and the United States 
for having failed to restrain its protégé. The first 
consequence is that Georgia has paid the price of 
Saakashvili’s folly, with the definitive loss of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. The second consequence is triggered 
by Russia’s continued occupation of strategic points in 
Georgia-proper, which means not peacekeeping but 
threatened strangulation of the Georgian economy and 
its role in the transit of oil and gas from the Caspian to 
the West. It also means that business as usual has become 
impossible, as already announced between NATO and 
Russia, and with more important decisions pending in 
both the EU and US. The third consequence is that the 
EU should immediately step up its policies to integrate 
Ukraine, with real perspectives of membership subject to 
the standard criteria. The fourth unknown consequence is 
how far this deteriorating process between Russia and 
the West will go. Russia may pretend, with its petro-
power and wealth, to be immune from any actions by the 
West, but beyond the short-term it is vulnerable. 
Whatever these unknowns, already Russia has crossed a 
red line with its strategic occupation of Georgia-proper, 
rather than the option just to push Georgia out of South 
Ossetia. This latter option would have met with 
widespread understanding internationally. But with its 
chosen option Russia has placed itself in another 
category, which is a throwback to earlier times, and 
totally incompatible with the political and moral 
principles of modern Europe.  
ost-mortem indeed for the families of the dead, 
killed in a small war that should not have 
happened. A small war, but one with massive 
implications. This was Europe’s first war of the 21
st 
century, which has seen Russia acting in line with the 
European  realpolitik models of the 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries.
1  
The rest of Europe drew profound conclusions from its 
dreadful history of the two world wars. The European 
Union has become a space where war between its nations 
is inconceivable, where enmities were overcome with 
reconciliation and integration. This West European space, 
coming as close as conceivable in practice to the Kantian 
ideal zone of ‘eternal peace’, has expanded to the East. 
But Russia today is intent on redrawing the map of 
Europe between this Europe, which is both peaceful and 
democratic, and the other Europe in which its dictatorial 
leadership is ready to go to war in order to satisfy its 
hunger for hegemonic power.  
Is this being overdramatic? Russia had two options in 
responding to Saakashvili’s attack on Tskhinvali on 
August 8
th. Option 1 was simply to drive Georgian forces 
out of South Ossetia and to exclude the possibility that 
Georgia might ever again pretend to regain its so-called 
‘territorial integrity’ over either Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia; to make Georgia pay a due price for 
Saakashvili’s folly. Option 2 was to invade Georgia-
proper, destroy not only military and but also strategic 
civilian infrastructures, establish checkpoints that cut 
Georgia into pieces, and more generally display the 
presence of an occupying power with hegemonic 
                                                      
1 As argued in more detail by Ivan Krastev, in “Russia and the 
Georgian war: The great-power trap”, Open Democracy, 21 
August 2008 (www.opendemocracy.net/Russia).  
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objectives. Option 1 would have met a large degree of 
understanding in Europe and the rest of the world. In 
choosing Option 2 instead, Russia’s leadership places 
itself in another category, and indeed in another Europe, 
in which no support has been heard even in the CIS 
except from the pathetic President Lukashenko of 
Belarus,
2 a fateful option since it obliges the rest of 
Europe and the West to consider where this choice may 
now lead. 
The trap and the blunder. This small war was preceded 
by a consistent policy under Putin, and most notably 
since the Rose Revolution of 2003, to undermine 
Georgia. It has not only protected the secessionist 
entities, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but been 
consistently devious in evading any serious peace and 
reconciliation negotiations, either under UN or OSCE 
auspices. It has engaged in policies of creeping 
annexation, notably through issuing Russian passports to 
these populations, and installing Russian officials in key 
security positions. It has tolerated or encouraged 
provocative actions by the separatists, as typified by the 
artillery shelling of Georgian villages of South Ossetia in 
the days and months leading up to the invasion. It has 
seen in President Saakashvili a highly provocable 
character. Russia tried but failed to crush Georgia 
politically with economic sanctions in 2006. This time, in 
August 2008, the Russian leadership got the pretext to 
invade Georgia in order to destroy President Saakashvili 
politically and to cripple Georgia’s statehood and 
economy. 
Oh yes, Georgia started the war. When the television 
showed live footage of Georgian land-to-land grad 
rockets raining down on Tskhinvali in the night of   
August 8
th, all observers said they must be crazy. Two 
months ago, I was hearing reports of war-talk in Tbilisi in 
circles close to President Saakashvili. This could only 
mean war between Georgia and Russia, “no further 
comment required”, I thought inadequately. Saakashvili 
was even heard saying recently that a military solution 
was possible, as long as it was done cleverly (!). 
Saakashvili’s fateful miscalculation was militarily 
suicidal and politically irresponsible. As Ghia Nodia, a 
distinguished scholar and now Georgian minister of 
education, has just written, Georgia was forced by Russia 
into a lose-lose situation.
3 Russia’s South Ossetian 
puppets could go on with their pin-prick provocations, as 
in their shelling of Georgian villages on the nights of 
August 6
th and 7
th, at the cost to Saakashvili of his losing 
credibility with the Georgian people; or Saakashvili could 
                                                      
2 President Lukashenko, having been reprimanded by Moscow 
for his silence over the war with Georgia by the Russian 
Ambassador in Minsk, finally on August 19
th in a meeting with 
President Medvedev declared that “Russia acted calmly, wisely 
and beautifully”, as reported in RIA Novosti, 22 August 2008. 
3 Ghia Nodia, “The war for Georgia: Russia, the west and the 
future”, Open Democracy, 15 August 2008 
(www.opendemocracy.net/Russia). 
try a decisive counter attack, in which case he would be 
at war with Russia and lose in another way. And so the 
trap was set. This is the logic of Russia’s leadership 
today.  
Saakashvili’s blunder will most probably cost him his 
job, and deservedly so, to be replaced hopefully by a 
more competent democrat. But it also means 
irrecoverable losses to Georgia. There is no chance now 
or ever – or let us say for any foreseeable future – of 
Georgia being able to negotiate back its called ‘territorial 
integrity’.  
Since the beginning of the war the Russian media, and 
especially the official television channels, have sustained 
a non-stop propaganda offensive, combining extreme 
selectivity with huge slices of disinformation. The PR 
campaign was indeed portraying Russia’s actions on 
Russian TV as conforming with Option 1 described 
above. Russian TV was almost exclusively showing 
scenes of destruction in South Ossetia and of refugees in 
Northern Ossetia, and Russia’s humanitarian assistance 
there. There was initially little or no coverage of Russian 
bombardments of Poti and Gori, nor Russia’s occupation 
of much of Georgia with armoured personnel carriers and 
tanks. The immediate headlines were that 2,000 people 
were killed in Tskhinvali by the Georgian artillery fire of 
8 August. These numbers were never justified, and the 
first independent NGO people to enter Tskhinvali 
suggested exaggeration on the scale of ten times. Russia’s 
international TV programme “Russia Today” for several 
days carried as subtitle to its coverage the single word 
Genocide  in huge font. By August 22
nd the Russian 
prosecutor indicated that there had been recorded 133 
civilian deaths in Tskhinvali. Yet the propaganda 
offensive was effective enough to secure unanimous 
votes in the Russian parliament on August 25
th favouring 
recognition of the demands by Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia for independence, which President Medvedev 
duly agreed to on the following day.  
What is this state of mind of the Kremlin and (Moscow’s) 
White House? They have pumped up a doctrine of a 
Russia threatened by enemies. They build on the sense of 
national humiliation felt upon the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the chaotic Yeltsin years. They rejoice in 
Russia’s new petro-wealth and petro-power, and trumpet 
their sense of impunity to indulge in macho politics on 
the world stage. They produce a comprehensive 
propaganda show, in which the domestic media have 
become mere choreography for the leadership, while 
founding new so-called international institutes in Paris 
and New York to promote a pseudo ideology called 
‘sovereign democracy’. The strategy is to find ways to 
regain ground lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and first of all in the European ‘near abroad’. The 
advance East by NATO and the European Union, and of 
democratic political regimes that these organisations 
favour, must be stopped. Russia is being encircled and 
threatened by these enemies. And now it uses military 
force in support of these objectives. Dmitri Rogozin, Post-Mortem on Europe’s First War of the 21
st Century | 3 
Russian Ambassador to NATO, in a press conference a 
few days ago challenged the West: “Is NATO willing to 
go to war over Georgia?” With which Russian diplomatic 
discourse has thus descended to the ultimate depth of 
realpolitik brutality.  
Where at this time was the United States, supplier to 
Georgia of military training and sponsor for NATO 
membership? On August 13
th the United States decided 
to send in militarily escorted humanitarian assistance, in a 
demonstration of support for Tbilisi. But what was the 
United States advising its Georgian friends on the days 
and hours before the fateful decision. Secretary of State 
Rice has said that she had been cautioning against 
military action. The State Department surely knew more 
than the war-talk hear-say that reached unofficial circles 
in Brussels. Was the leader of NATO and the world’s 
global superpower not trying hard enough to restrain such 
action? Could it not have raised the issues of Russia’s 
behaviour in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by more 
forceful diplomacy? In any event, the United States is 
gravely at fault for sponsoring an actor that it could not, 
or did not try hard enough to control. President Bush 
seems to have given no warning that the United States 
would sanction an ill-advised move, while his other 
foreign policy actions (Iraq, Guantanamo, etc.) have 
given great encouragement to Putin also to take the law 
into his own hands, and to mount a continuing diplomatic 
guerrilla campaign against the EU’s attempt to bring 
peace to the Balkans, and to Kosovo in particular. 
Sarkozy-mediated peace plan. And where was the 
European Union at this time? Actually it had been urging 
Tbilisi to adopt a different strategy towards Abkhazia in 
particular. This would have been a policy to open up 
economic relations with Abkhazia, to go through a period 
of normalisation and confidence-building measures, and 
to defer attempted negotiations over final status for later. 
It also was surely advising against war-talk. The EU was 
thus advocating a peace plan different to that which 
Saakashvili advanced in the spring of 2008, in which he 
had pressed for final status negotiations as part of the 
package without delay, and which was received dead on 
arrival in Sukhumi. At the eleventh hour before this war, 
German foreign minister Franz-Walter Steinmeyer flew 
to Tblilsi and Moscow with a sensible proposal along 
these lines. Russia dismissed it with a bundle of pre-
conditions, such as achieving confidence-building first. 
Russia did not want a real peace process.  
France, as current EU Presidency, moved fast to facilitate 
the cease-fire, with visits by President Sarkozy to 
Moscow and Tbilisi brokering a 6-point agreement. All 
but one point are sensible. But Russia insisted on 
inserting the second fateful phrase under point 5, namely 
that Russia could undertake “additional security 
measures” pending agreement on an international 
mechanism. Sarkozy, acting it seems on his own and 
clearly travelling without the company of Javier Solana, 
judged it right to accept this phrase and to virtually 
impose it on Saakashvili. Its real meaning became 
evident by August 19
th, when President Medvedev said 
that Russia would comply in withdrawing its forces by 
August 22
nd, except for 500 troops who would stay to 
implement the second phrase in point 5. Maybe the six-
point plan stopped the fighting or its further escalation, 
although the deal was done after Moscow had achieved 
its apparent military objectives. But it left the door open 
for the ‘additional measures’ which look like meaning 
continued occupation without end.  
 
The six-point peace plan between Georgia and 
Russia mediated by President Sarkozy 
1.  Abstain from the use of force. 
2.  Cease hostilities definitively. 
3.  Assure free access for humanitarian assistance. 
4.  Georgian military forces should withdraw to their 
usual places of deployment. 
5.  Russian military forces should withdraw to the 
lines preceding the outbreak of hostilities. While 
waiting for an international mechanism, Russian 
peacekeeping forces will put into effect additional 
security measures. 
6.  Opening of international discussions on the 
modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. 
 
Russian forces had struck Georgia to cripple it 
strategically along both horizontal and vertical axes. On 
the horizontal axis, Russia bombed the commercial port 
of Poti, and installed its military on the East-West 
highway at Gori, and blew up the railway bridge that 
links Baku to the Black Sea. The railway network is 
serving as an additional outlet for Kazakh oil shipped 
across the Caspian, and its extension into Turkey at Kars 
is currently under construction On  August 23
rd a train 
loaded with Azeri oil was blown up by a mine near Gori. 
On the ‘vertical axis’, which received less attention in the 
media, Russia (or Abkhazia) blew up or mined bridges 
along the single road into the Svaneti region of high 
mountain peaks bordering Russia, and which separate 
Abkhazia from South Ossetia.  
In the days following signature of the peace plan, 
President Sarkozy telephoned President Medvedev 
several times to express his concern that Russia was not 
complying with its commitment to withdraw its military 
from Georgia, each time receiving commitments to 
withdraw. Sarkozy’s exasperation over non-compliance 
reached the point that he threatened to convene an 
extraordinary session of the European Council to decide 
on appropriate measures. By August 22
nd Russia was 
making major withdrawals, with a column 7 kilometres 
long of Russian tanks, armoured personnel carriers and 
trucks heading north. The Russian invasion had been 
massive, with maybe 1,000 or more pieces of heavy 
equipment. But Russian checkpoints remained, with an 4 | Michael Emerson 
enlarged buffer zone south of the Ossetian border close to 
Georgia’s East-West highway, and with one unit 
apparently now implanted to the south of this highway. 
The Russian military is also digging itself into positions 
at the Black Sea port of Poti. Enough is enough. On 
August 24
th, France convened an extraordinary European 
Council meeting for the 1
st of September to decide how 
to react, with suspension of the negotiations of a new 
agreement presumably on the agenda. 
What next? By bombarding and invading Georgia-proper 
and failing to withdraw completely from Georgia-proper, 
Russia’s leadership has crossed the red line between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in European 
affairs. By its actions, Russia has forced the rest of 
Europe to think back not only to the sight of Soviet tanks 
in Prague in 1968, but also to its experience of 
appeasement policies towards a certain nationalist 
dictator of the mid-20
th century, in which one small 
European country was sacrificed first, and then a bigger 
one.  
Presumably inaction by the West will be taken by 
Russia’s leadership as an encouragement to move on 
from ‘success’ in Georgia to pursue comparable 
objectives, methods and tactics in Ukraine and Moldova. 
More precisely and finely, it may be supposed that the 
Russian leadership hopes that the small war with Georgia 
will deliver a sufficiently credible lesson to others, such 
that Russia can achieve its next objectives without the use 
of force.  
Such a scenario has already been visible in Russian 
policy towards Ukraine for some years, with threats and 
actions aiming at destabilisation. But Ukraine is Georgia 
multiplied by 10. The strategy and the message now is: If 
you persist in your NATO aspirations, Russia will create 
difficulties to the point of destruction of your statehood. 
Putin has even said this directly to Ukraine. Crimea is 
Ukraine’s Achilles heel on two accounts, the Sebastapol 
naval base and the inter-ethnic tensions being stirred up 
by the ethnic Russian population there, compounded by 
tensions with the Tartar minority who have returned there 
from their Soviet deportation locations. In 2003 Russia 
attempted to redraw the border with Crimea by 
unilaterally building a causeway to the island of Tuzla at 
the mouth of the Azov Sea, until Ukrainian protests had 
this stopped. Mayor Lushkov of Moscow and various 
Russian parliamentarians are advocating reneging on the 
1997 Treaty for the Black Sea Fleet to evacuate the naval 
base there by 2017. The dispatch of Russian warships 
from Sebastapol to participate in the current conflict with 
Georgia has already led President Yushchenko to pass a 
(highly implausible) decree requiring the Russian Black 
Sea fleet to request advance permission from Ukraine to 
pass through Ukrainian waters leaving or entering the 
port. Lushkov’s billionaire wife, who has major 
investments in Crimea, is reported to be funding 
foundations that support Russian nationalist activities 
there. Russia still refuses to cooperate over demarcating 
its frontier with Ukraine, after 17 years of independence.
4 
Ukraine currently seeks Russian recognition of the 
genocidal Holodomor, the Stalin-directed famine of the 
1930s that cost millions of lives. But Russia, successor 
state to the Soviet Union, will neither recognise this piece 
of history, nor apologise for it. Instead Putin describes the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as the 20
th century’s greatest 
tragedy. 
Moldova has already been subject to years of Russian 
prevarication over the Transnistria conflict, unless it 
might be settled on terms that would give the Russian 
community there disproportionate political powers of 
control, as proposed in the Kozak memorandum of 2003, 
which Moldova rejected at the last minute. Since then 
Russia has manifested its displeasure by two years of 
pseudo-technical economic sanctions, blocking imports 
of Moldovan wines on grounds similar to those for 
Georgia.  
The war with Georgia has to be viewed as much more 
than a localised action by Russia to punish Saakashvili. 
The wider view sees Russia using all political, 
diplomatic, economic and military means to change the 
map of Eastern Europe in favour of a hybrid neo-
imperialist/neo-Soviet strategy. In the classic manner of 
nationalist-authoritarian regimes, it propagates the idea 
that it is surrounded by enemies, warranting speeches 
now by Medvedev that it will defend “its citizens 
anywhere with crushing force”, which could be referring 
to its diaspora anywhere among its neighbouring 
European countries. The tactics employed seek to avoid 
offensive military action, or to keep them to the last. 
Better use non-military tactics, but with the credible 
background threat to use overwhelming military force if 
circumstances make this ‘justifiable’. Saakashvili 
presented Russia with just such an opportunity in the 
name of ‘peacekeeping’.  
Presumably Russia will want the Georgian episode to 
cool down in the near future, before embarking on new 
adventures. But if Russia keeps its military in Georgia-
proper, as seems now most likely, it will not only be a 
continuing source of ugly scenes with Georgians 
brandishing ‘Russia go home’ banners; it also will be   
read by the West as the signal that the name of the game 
has changed.
5 Russia is presuming that the West is not 
willing to defend countries such as Ukraine, like Georgia, 
with military action, at least until and unless they were 
NATO members.
6. To get such ideas rolling, as Dmitri 
                                                      
4 In July, however, it signed a treaty with China to recognise 
that border, ceding territory on a disputed river island to win 
agreement. Russia makes realistic concessions to its bigger 
neighbour. 
5 Ron Asmus, “NATO’s Hour”, Wall Street Journal, 18 August 
2008. 
6 Anatol Lieven goes further in “The west shares the blame for 
Georgia”, Financial Times, 14 August 2008. Post-Mortem on Europe’s First War of the 21
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Rogozin is doing, is evidently seen as the best way to 
undermine these countries’ NATO membership 
ambitions.  
Russia’s leadership may also be presuming that with its 
petro-power it is immune from economic and political 
sanctions that the West might employ. But is that correct? 
Already well before the war with Georgia, US 
Presidential candidate John McCain had been advocating 
Russia’s expulsion from the G8. The first unintended 
consequence for Russia’s leadership of the war with 
Georgia is that it may help McCain’s electoral chances, 
and speed up Russia’s expulsion from the West. But also 
a leading Democrat adviser to the Obama campaign has 
explored the agenda for more active counter-measures, 
including not only advancing Ukraine and Georgia’s 
NATO membership, but also building up NATO’s 
forward deployment of military resources in its new 
member states that border or are close to Russia.
7 
The EU may, because of its greater dependence on 
Russian energy supplies, may again (in its inglorious 
tradition) leave the heavy lifting to the US. However the 
EU was already earlier this year being pushed by events 
(Estonian monument, Lithuanian oil supplies, Polish 
meat, UK Litvinenko affair, etc.) towards working out 
principles of solidarity between its members in response 
to Russia’s bullying behaviour towards individual EU 
member states. The EU may have to develop such 
principles for its close neighbours too. For the EU there is 
a long list of sanctions that could be taken in graduated 
steps, some jointly with the US. These proceed from 
declarations condemning Russian actions (already done), 
to suspension of the negotiations over a new agreement 
(already advocated by some member states), the revoking 
of visa facilitation
8 and the suspension of numerous 
operating programmes. If, for example, Russia’s actions 
towards Ukraine became analogous to what has just been 
seen in Georgia, economic sanctions by the EU and the 
US together could include banning Russian direct and 
real estate investment in the EU, freezing financial assets 
of Russian companies and individuals, stopping new 
operations in Russia by the EBRD and the raising of 
capital by IPOs on Western stock exchanges, etc. Boycott 
of the Sochi winter Olympics scheduled for 2014 would 
naturally follow in due course, recalling the boycott by 
the US of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow over the 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
The list of hypothetical measures is long because it is a 
testimony to the huge progress that has been made in the 
                                                      
7 Ron Asmus, op. cit. 
8 Christa Freeland argued in the Financial Times on 22 August, 
in “As crazy as it sounds, the oligarchs could save Russia”, that 
EU countries should give Russia some of the ‘TNK-BP 
treatment’, in which pressure by BP’s Russian partners to 
replace the company chairman from BP has been accompanied 
by Russian government actions revoking the visas of BP-
seconded staff and harassing the company and its chairman 
through diverse administrative methods.  
last 18 years towards the normalisation of Russia’s place 
in Europe and the world. This has created new interests 
and incentive structures for the Russian private sector and 
Russia’s new middle classes and certainly even more so 
its new very rich classes. The reaction in Russia’s official 
rhetoric might be ‘we don’t care’. Such was exemplified 
recently by a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesman who answered a question about how bad 
relations with the US might get with remarks that Russia 
did not necessarily need relations with any other power. 
Russia’s reaction to NATO’s decision on August 18
th that 
there could not be ‘business as usual’ following the war 
with Georgia, was to announce itself that it was cutting 
off all working relations with NATO in response to the 
insult. Anticipating that Russia’s WTO membership 
negotiations would be an early casualty, Putin, declared 
pre-emptively on August 24
th that Russia was not 
interested in this any more. Indeed Russia’s petro-wealth 
and petro-power allow its officials and leadership to talk 
this way, but Russia’s economy is extremely vulnerable 
and weak beyond its natural resource sectors. And the 
‘modernisation’ objective and slogan of its leadership 
means becoming a competitive economy beyond being 
just a supplier of basic commodities, and that requires 
interdependence with Western economies.  
But would Russia raise the stakes, and try to cripple the 
EU economy by stopping oil and gas exports? What does 
the calculus look like here? For oil the disruption would 
be limited, since oil is a global commodity, and if Russia 
sells its oil to someone else, that releases other supplies in 
the world market. Both Lithuanian and the Czech 
Republic have been able to get other oil supplies into 
their refineries after Russia tried to sanction them.
9 For 
gas the situation is more difficult, but already the EU’s 
LNG facilities – built or under construction– amount to 
57% of the EU’s total gas imports.
10 The EU needs to 
increase gas storage capacities, complete its gas network 
connections and solidarity mechanisms between member 
states, increase alternative energy supplies, while 
retaining the option to take control of gas distribution 
facilities in which Gazprom has invested. Russia’s 
economy cannot last long without export earnings from 
the EU. So would it be ‘back to Brezhnev’, with joyless 
basic trade and little else? 
This is a sorry story to contemplate, but the alternative to 
beginning to think about it, and to get Russia too to think 
about it, is called appeasement. A western strategy of 
sanctioning Russia to get it to think about the wisdom of 
                                                      
9 Russia used the pretext of environmental concerns to stop oil 
supplies to Lithuania refinery after its privatization went to a 
Polish company rather than a Russian one. Russia suddenly cut 
off oil supplies to a Czech refinery the day after the signature 
of the US-Czech agreement to install anti-missile facilities, 
citing unspecified commercial and technical factors.  
10 Germany, alone among the major EU economies, has no 
LNG reception facilities, and should surely rectify this without 
delay 6 | Michael Emerson 
its ‘near abroad’ foreign policy would proceed 
cautiously, with graduated steps, in the hope that 
significant messages will be received and acted upon by 
the Russian leadership before triggering an escalation that 
would be hugely damaging for both sides. For example 
suspension of G8 membership and suspension of the 
EU’s negotiations over a new agreement could serve for 
starters.  
It does not have to come to this. There are plausible and 
desirable strategies for relations between Russia and the 
West. One such package was outlined in my paper of (as 
recently as) June 2008, based on several items of 
strategic importance: free trade with the EU to follow 
WTO accession, visa-free travel between the EU and 
Russia, deepening of relations with NATO (for example 
with a privileged summit process) and even the 
perspective of membership after a period of confidence-
building measures, which would have notably included a 
civilised and cooperative resolution of the Caucasus and 
Moldova conflicts.
11  
The argument was also made that the EU could deepen 
its policies to integrate Ukraine in ways that would be 
positive, or at least not harmful for Russia in the view of 
anyone not blinded by zero-sum thinking. But with 
Ukraine viewed by Russia as its big objective, the EU 
should in any case now step up its policies to help 
Ukraine become a soundly functioning democracy and 
economy. It has many levers to use, including free trade, 
visa-free travel, improving the legal system, rolling back 
corruption and criminality, inclusion in EU foreign policy 
initiatives and above all the ultimate incentive of 
membership if its political classes were to converge on 
this objective. The EU has already programmed a summit 
in September with Ukraine, and France in its capacity as 
Presidency was already in July signalling a will to use 
this occasion to extend to Ukraine an important political 
signal of support. The case for doing this is now 
redoubled. A successfully Europeanising Ukraine would 
help Moscow modernise its views of Europe and its 
future place there.  
But for the moment Russia chooses otherwise by its 
actions. President Medvedev proposed in his inaugural 
speeches a few words on the idea of a new pan-European 
security architecture. There have indeed been sufficiently 
serious and numerous disputes already since the 
beginning of the new millennium over the normative 
rules of international relations; the system is in disorder. 
But so far the west has seen nothing of substance from 
Moscow to work on, while events have spoken brutal 
realpolitik loud and clear.    
In the end Russia and Russians will have to decide where 
and what they want to be in Europe and the world. The 
present leadership seems satisfied with its macho foreign 
policy, but is on track for branding itself in the eyes of 
                                                      
11 M. Emerson, “Time for a Strategic Bargain with Russia”, 
CEPS Policy Brief, June 2008. 
the west as a duplicitous bully and semi-pariah state. But 
there can be no illusions about an easy or early change. 
As a recent study by the respected Levada centre reports: 
“The system of power cannot cope with either economic 
or external challenges. …It is rigid and fails to adapt to 
ever-changing circumstances, because it is built on the 
administrative vertical line, where bureaucracy is a proxy 
for politics, while PR and propaganda substitute for 
information and political actions – hence there is nobody 
to offset the power. Nor can it (the regime) adjust or 
change its own decisions.”
12 Moreover, as this same 
source goes on to argue, the socio-political mindset of the 
Russian population is easy prey for the xenophobic 
propaganda of an authoritarian regime: “In the mind of an 
average Russian, the scheme of collective thinking 
almost entirely boils down to opposition between ‘us’ 
(passive majority of ‘people like me’) and ‘them’ (aliens, 
be it those who are close to home, i.e. people in power, 
and those who are further away, who are ethnically, 
politically, ideologically and civilizationally alien).”
13 
Conclusions. The small war between Georgia and Russia 
from 8 to 22 August 2008 has shattered any remaining 
illusions over the frontiers of the normative map of 
Europe. In this first European war of the 21
st century, 
both Georgia and Russia in turn chose to use force to 
settle a separatist conflict. To be sure, these normative 
frontiers have become disputed over Kosovo, and actions 
by the United States (Iraq, Guantanamo) have crossed the 
normative red lines of international law, and emboldened 
Russian discourse over ‘double standards’ to justify 
actions such as they are now taking in Georgia.  
All the primary parties have to be criticised: Russia for 
setting a trap for Saakashvili to fall into, Georgia for its 
astounding military and political blunder in falling into it, 
the United States for having failed to restrain its protégé, 
and Russia again for invading and occupying Georgia-
proper under the bogus pretext of ‘peace-keeping’. As a 
secondary actor, France in its capacity as EU Presidency, 
rushed in to mediate a defective peace plan that left 
Russia with an excuse to continue its occupation of 
Georgia-proper. 
The first consequence is that Georgia has paid the price 
of Saakashvili’s folly. The Russian parliament 
unanimously voted for the independence of both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 25
th, thus following the 
model of Kosovo. This will not be recognised by the 
West, but nonetheless these territories are now 
irrecoverable for Georgia.  
                                                      
12 L. Gudkov, B. Dubin and Y. Levada, Проблема «элиты» в 
сегодняшней  России.  Размышления  над  результатами 
социологического исследования (The Problem of the Elite in 
Today’s Russia - Pondering over the results of a sociological 
survey), The Liberal Mission Foundation, Moscow, 2007, p. 
224. 
13 Ibid., p. 115. Post-Mortem on Europe’s First War of the 21
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The second consequence is triggered by Russia’s 
continued occupation of strategic points in Georgia (port 
of Poti and close to the East-West highway near Gori), 
which does not mean peacekeeping but rather, threatened 
strangulation of the Georgian economy and its role in the 
transit of oil and gas from the Caspian to the West. It also 
means that business as usual has become impossible, as 
already announced between NATO and Russia, and with 
more important decisions impending in both the EU and 
US. The EU may well decide at its extraordinary 
European Council meeting on September 1
st that 
negotiations over a new agreement cannot proceed. 
Whatever the outgoing Bush administration decides, the 
presidential election campaign has already highlighted 
the case for expelling Russia from G8. President 
Medvedev’s call for a new pan-European security 
architecture, initially regarded as worthy of discussion by 
some Europe governments, is now hard to take seriously. 
The logic of the relationship has changed sign, from 
incentives for cooperation to sanctions.  
The third consequence is that the EU should immediately 
signal an intensification of its work to accelerate the 
Europeanisation of Ukraine – and of Moldova as well. 
For Ukraine the occasion to make a major move forward 
is already programmed with the EU-Ukraine summit due 
in September, which should extend real perspectives for 
Ukraine’s membership as and when it achieves the 
standard criteria of soundly functioning democracy and 
the rule of law. For Russia the message can be that the 
mechanisms of integration into modern Europe are 
entirely benign, and actually extendable to it too, adapted 
of course in degree to the Russian reality. 
The fourth but unknown consequence, however, is how 
far the current deteriorating process between Russia and 
the West will go. Russia may pretend, with its petro-
power and wealth to be immune from any actions by the 
West, but beyond the short-term it is vulnerable. Already 
in the week of the war, mobile capital left Russia and the 
wealth of Russian stock exchange assets dropped. 
Political and economic sanctions could go much further. 
This will depend not only on whether Russia continues its 
occupation of Georgia, but also on whether it pursues an 
analogous strategy towards Ukraine, which is Georgia 
multiplied by 10 by all measures from population to 
proximity to the EU. Russia’s political rhetoric and 
tactical actions towards Ukraine point in the same 
direction, notably over Crimea with orchestration of 
ethnic tensions and threats to renege on withdrawal of the 
Black Sea fleet. The reputational and economic costs to 
Russia from such a policy will mount. Russia’s leaders 
may in due course come to understand the counter-
productivity of their macho realpolitik, but then they will 
have to change their message to their own people. 
Whatever these unknowns, Russia has crossed the red 
line with its choice of what above was already called 
option 2 (strategic occupation of Georgia), rather than 
option 1 (push Georgia out of South Ossetia). Option 1 
would have drawn widespread understanding 
internationally for Russia as a responsible actor. With 
Option 2 it has placed itself in another category, which is 
a throwback to earlier times, and totally incompatible 
with the political and moral principles of modern Europe.  About CEPS
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